

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
 THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
 (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

- 25X1 1. Since the death of Stalin, Cominformist-Yugoslav relations and more precisely, Yugoslav-Soviet relations, have entered a new phase, presumably transitory, but in any case susceptible to further development.
2. It is recognized that the Yugoslav-Cominformist conflict which erupted in the well known Bucharest Resolution was not the result of substantial ideology divergences, but rather of increasing Soviet interference in Yugoslav internal affairs which caused a stiffening of the latter's Government for which Marshal Tito became the interpreter. The personal motives in this conflict are evident when it is considered that the Soviet and Yugoslav attitude respectively reflected the precise wills, on the one hand of Stalin (for whom at Bucharest, Zhdanov was the instrument), and of Tito. Stalin had decided not to permit others to refuse obedience to his orders; Tito was adamant in the defense of his own prestige. The intransigence of Stalin, who probably became more tenacious in the years that preceded his death, precluded any possibility of an understanding between USSR and Yugoslavia. This desire for a resumption of cordial relations between the two countries was clearly expressed by Tito and Kardelj in the course of recent declarations. It should not be forgotten, furthermore, that such declarations found echo in the statements by Malenkov, to whom it is stated Tito is bound by ties of longstanding friendship. The concomitance of these declarations suggests the hypothesis that they were previously concurred and that they are a prelude to closer understanding.
3. In any case, in the evaluation of Yugoslav-Cominformist relations and the consideration of their possible developments, the following points should not be lost from sight:
- The Yugoslav regime and the Soviet regime present points of close ideological affinity;
 - The peoples of Yugoslavia and the USSR, to say nothing of those of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, originate from the same ethnic stock and Yugoslavia has always looked toward the USSR as the most complete expression of Slavism.

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- c. Those responsible for Yugoslav and Soviet policies, Tito and Malenkov, were and perhaps have remained linked by bonds of friendship.

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- d. The Orthodox Church [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] has a community of rite with the Russian Church.

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- e. Yugoslavia, once reconciled in its relations with the USSR, could perform the function of intermediary between the West and East and rise in that position to a role of first rank. Such a function would offer greater advantages to Yugoslavia and would permit the exertion of a greater influence than would be allowed Yugoslavia as merely a dynamic partner in a "third force movement."
- f. The constitution of a Balkan Federation might meet with the consent and support of Malenkov, who in the past, was said to have regarded such a development as opportune, and it is possible therefore, that he could now be induced to recognize an eventual Yugoslav pre-eminence in such a Federation. Yugoslav National Communism, rather than acting as a divisive force in the Cominformist bloc, could constitute the best Cominform medium of influence within the Western Bloc and, without provoking strong reactions, would be able to further the development of Communist ideologies throughout the world.

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